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Asian Powers and a
Transitioning Gulf Order
Jonathan Fulton

Regional orders became a more salient topic of study in International Relations
with the transition of the international order from Cold War bipolarity to a
US-centered unipolarity. As Buzan and Waever wrote, “the regional level is where
the extremes of national and global security interplay, and where most of the
action occurs.”1 One important post-Cold War development in regionalism was
described by Funabashi as the ‘Asianization’ of Asia: “As Asian nations phase out
the special relationships they have had with former colonial powers and integrate
with the global economy, they are starting to see neighboring countries as trading partners, providers of investment opportunities and competitors.”2 Chang has
expanded upon this political and economic focus of Asianization, describing a
“dramatic intensification of intra-Asian interactions and flows in industrial, financial, demographic, sociopolitical, cultural, and ecological spheres.”3
A by-product of this has been a broader conceptual approach to Asia, as regions
and states across Eurasia and the Indian Ocean region (IOR) integrate politically,
economically, and culturally. The gradual shift of the global economic center of
gravity shows what this means in material terms; located around the mid-North
Atlantic Ocean in 1980, it is projected to be squarely between India and China
by 2050. Much of global economic growth is coming from Asia, accounting for
approximately one-third of global GDP in 2000 and expected to be more than
50% by 2040.4 States that had been at the periphery of a Western-centered globalization and were therefore of marginal importance to each other have formed
dense economic and political networks, giving shape to what some refer to as the
Asian century.5
Currently the international order is undergoing another transition, from US-led
unipolarity to a less centered system that will likely be multipolar.6 While the
systemic consequences of this transition have inspired a large body of analysis,
the regional implications are no less important. Regions and subregions across
Eurasia and the IOR, long shaped by systemic unipolarity, are increasingly
competitive theaters as their own ordering principles begin to shift in response.
Perceptions of hegemonic retreat remove restrictions on actors at the regional
level, intensifying competition, which in turn affects the foreign policies of extraregional powers. At the systemic level this is exacerbated by the ‘great power
competition’ narrative taking hold in the US, China, and Russia to characterize
DOI: 10.4324/9781003227373-2
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their complex relationships. Across Eurasia and the IOR this is made manifest in
competing visions of order inherent in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),
the US’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and Russia’s Greater Eurasian Partnership.7
In the Gulf subregion, this transitioning order could have significant consequences. In the West the Gulf has long been perceived as the outer limits of the
Middle East–North Africa (MENA), whereas the governments of both China and
India have identified it as part of West Asia–North Africa (WANA). This WANA
designation reflects a different conceptualization of a region that defies easy geopolitical categorization. Given the Gulf’s strategic and economic importance,
it features in the foreign policy and energy security strategies of countries far
beyond its shores. The Strait of Hormuz and Bab el Mandeb are two of the global
economy’s crucial chokepoints, giving the Arabian Peninsula a geo-strategic
weight. With the Indo-Pacific becoming a policy framework for governments and
academics, the acknowledgment of this subregion’s importance in the north-west
IOR makes it conceptually useful to consider the Gulf states within Funabashi’s
Asianization of Asia. This is consistent with a small but growing body of academic work that has largely focused on the economic implications of Gulf-Asia
relations, with energy trade dominating.8
Security studies, however, remains under-analyzed,9 a fact that can largely be
attributed to US military preponderance in the Gulf. Deeply entrenched throughout the post-Cold War era, US security commitments to the member states of
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and its securitized presence in Iraq since
2003 have supported a regional status quo that favors the Gulf monarchies. This
has facilitated their deepening engagement with extra-regional states other than
the US. As a result, there has been little need for these other extra-regional powers to make substantial contributions to Gulf security, a situation that is not likely
to remain sustainable for the long-term. On the one hand, the depth of economic
relations and large expatriate populations in the region indicate a need to assume
a role in securing those interests. On the other, the perception of a looming US
retrenchment, or at least a reduced role, is a motivating factor at the systemic
level. A series of tweets in 2019 from President Trump justified this perception:
China gets 91% of its Oil from the Straight [sic], Japan 62%, & many other
countries likewise. So why are we protecting the shipping lanes for other
countries (many years) for zero compensation. All of these countries should
be protecting their own ships on what has always been a dangerous journey.
We don’t even need to be there in that the U.S. has just become (by far) the
largest producer of Energy anywhere in the world!10
While the tweets can be dismissed as the personal preferences of the former president, it does reinforce a widespread assumption that the US is reconsidering its
role in the Gulf and broader MENA, one that has not changed with President Joe
Biden’s administration. Consequentially extra-regional powers with deep interests there must recalibrate their own approaches to the Gulf, especially where
security issues are concerned.
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This chapter sets the stage for the country-specific case studies of this edited
volume. It analyzes the Gulf as a regional security complex (RSC) that has historically been shaped by a nexus of regional and systemic pressures. The contemporary Gulf order faces significant challenges at both of those levels, making
it a difficult subregion to navigate for Asian powers that have long based their
approaches to the Gulf on the foundation of US hegemony. This ordering principle is changing, and as a result the countries studied here – China, India, Japan,
Pakistan, Singapore, and South Korea – have to determine how they will go about
securing their interests in the Gulf, adopting presences that could either shore up,
disrupt, or exit from a fragile regional status quo. It finds that these US allies or
partners, not yet ready to pursue independent regional strategies, will continue
to support US preferences for Gulf order with bandwagoning approaches. The
increasingly hostile bilateral relationship between China and the US, however,
means Chinese support for US policies in the Gulf cannot be taken for granted.
Rather than a bandwagoner, China is a strategic hedger, developing its regional
capabilities in anticipation of a more overtly competitive relationship with the US.
The Gulf as a theater of great power competition is another variable that extraregional states will have to consider in developing their policies toward the Gulf
countries.

Ordering the Gulf: Regional and Systemic Pressures
This section analyses the features of Gulf order, beginning with the assertion that
it is best understood as an RSC. It then analyzes the Gulf RSC at two levels, the
regional and systemic, to emphasize the different factors that leaders of Asian
(and other extra-regional) countries must consider while engaging with their
counterparts in the Gulf.11
Buzan defined an RSC as “a group of states whose primary security concerns
link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically
be considered apart from one another.”12 This is an apt description of the Gulf subregion, where the eight states “focus intensely on each other and devote the bulk
of their security resources to relations with each other and have done so for decades.”13 Importantly, extra-regional great powers, responding to pressures at the
systemic level, may become actors within an RSC, even though the region may
not feature significantly in their own direct security concerns.14 The steady expansion of the US presence in the Gulf is an example of the centrality of an extraregional power in the Gulf and the impact it can have on regional order.15 US
interests have a major impact on the security and foreign policies of every Gulf
country, while Gulf states feature significantly lower on the list of US concerns.
The insights from RSC theory are useful here as Gulf states, as discussed below,
find their own region especially threatening, and alignments with extra-regional
powers have long been a foreign policy strategy, especially for the smaller Arab
Gulf monarchies who lack conventional power capabilities when compared with
Iran and Iraq.16
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The most salient source of instability within the Gulf RSC is hostilities
between Iran and its Gulf neighbors. This has been a consistent feature since the
Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) was established in 1979 and ideological competition between regime types became prevalent, with post-monarchal Iran attempting to export its revolution to other Gulf states.17 Iranian dissatisfaction with a
MENA status quo supported by the US and favoring its GCC rivals has fueled
its support for revisionist non-state actors – Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis –
throughout the region. This is perceived as a threat to regime stability among
the Gulf monarchies, an especially grave concern given instability across MENA
in the wake of the Arab uprisings. The longstanding rivalry between revisionist Iran and the status quo GCC has resulted in a sub-systemic bipolarity, often
described as a Middle East cold war.18 US military preponderance was seen as the
factor that prevented escalation to active hostilities, although this began to change
during the Trump administration’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign against Iran.
Suffering economic and political isolation, Tehran adopted a more overtly aggressive approach to its neighbors, most notably with the spectacular drone attack on
Saudi Arabian oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais in September 2019.
Intra-GCC rivalry is another factor that shapes the regional security environment. Tensions between the Gulf monarchies have always been prevalent but
given the common external challenges, they largely remained in the background.
This changed with the dramatic crisis that erupted in 2017 between Qatar on the
one hand and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain on the other, drawing
global attention to a rift that had widened in the wake of the Arab uprisings.19
Qatari support for political Islamist groups put it at odds with the other four, all
of which preferred maintaining a pre-uprising status quo that marginalized groups
like the Muslim Brotherhood. Shortly after Qatar was isolated, Saudi Arabia and
the UAE announced the formation of a bilateral alliance, further emphasizing the
fractious nature of the GCC.20 Kuwait and Oman both pushed for reconciliation
but to little effect; the GCC crisis continued until January 2021, when the two
sides began what will likely be a long process of reconciliation.
These tensions at the regional level are important considerations for extraregional actors who must weigh the relative gains of engagement with certain
states against the relative costs of alienating a rival. For example, in 2018 Chinese
President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to the UAE, where he upgraded the existing
bilateral relationship from a strategic partnership to a comprehensive strategic
partnership, the highest level in China’s diplomatic hierarchy. This elevated the
UAE to the same level as Saudi Arabia and Iran.21 Months later, Qatar’s Emir
Tamim Al Thani visited Beijing, an occasion that offered the same opportunity
to upgrade the Sino-Qatari strategic partnership signed in 2014. Instead, China
announced that it wanted to continue developing the relationship through the
existing partnership agreement rather than raising Qatar to the same level as its
GCC rivals.22 While it was not made explicit, the implication appears that Beijing
recognized that it had more to gain through deeper relations with the UAE rather
than with an isolated Qatar.23
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At the systemic level, the nature of the US presence in the Gulf is the major
consideration for extra-regional states. With a deeply militarized presence on
the Arabian Peninsula, US preponderance shapes the options available to other
states. This began with the articulation of the Carter Doctrine of 1980, which
proclaimed,
An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region
will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of
America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary,
including military force.24
Yet it was not until the post-Cold War period when Kuwait (1991), Bahrain
(1991), Qatar (1992), and the UAE (1994) signed defense cooperation agreements (DCAs) with the US that created the actual security architecture that
has sustained the current regional order. Oman was an outlier, having signed
a facilities access agreement (FAA) in 1980. There are approximately 35,000
US troops in the Gulf, with approximately 13,500 in Kuwait, 8,000 in Qatar,
5,000 in Bahrain, 3,500 in the UAE, 3,000 in Saudi Arabia, and a few hundred
in Oman.25 In addition to the troops, there are substantial military installations
throughout the five states. Kuwait hosts US personnel at Camp Arifjan, Camp
Buehring, Ali Al-Salem Air Base, Shaykh Ahmed al-Jabir Air Base, and Camp
Patriot. Bahrain has had a US naval command presence since 1948, although it
was not an especially significant one until Central Command was established
during the Regan administration and the Bahraini base housed the naval component, NAVCENT. Post-Desert Storm, the onshore command presence was
established, and the Fifth Fleet was reconstituted in 1995. All of this is housed
at the Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain. This facility has undergone
a $590 million expansion that started in 2010, bringing the total US cost of
the facility to approximately $2 billion.26 Bahrain’s Khalifa bin Salman Port
accommodates US aircraft carriers and amphibious ships, its Shaykh Issa Air
Base hosts US military aircraft, and it is also home to a facility for US Special
Operations Forces.27 Qatar hosts US Air Force personnel at the Al Udeid air
base, which was built at a cost of $1 billion in the 1990s and has since undergone expansion and enhancement with some US funding.28 The UAE hosts US
military personnel at the Jebel Ali Port; that and other UAE ports collectively
host more US naval ships than any ports outside of the US. There are also US
troops stationed at the Al Dhafra air base and naval facilities in Fujairah.29
Oman, under its FAA with the US, provides access to military airfields in
Muscat, Thurait, Masirah Island, and Musanah.30 These DCAs and the FAA
have been complemented with significant arms sales, military cooperation, and
joint training exercises.31
A recurring theme in each of the chapters of this book is that extra-regional
states must consider their Gulf relationships in the context of their relationship
with the US. As US allies and partners, India, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore
have adopted Gulf policies that align with US preferences and have relied on a

Asian Powers and a Transitioning Gulf Order

13

bandwagoning strategy to secure their interests. Their deep ties to the GCC support both their own economic interests and the US-preferred status quo. Their
relations with Iran are also shaped by the status of US-Iran relations. After the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed in 2015, each of these
Asian countries looked at Iran as an important untapped market. When the Trump
administration withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and implemented new sanctions, that short-lived engagement with Iran came to an end, proving that the economic and political benefits of accepting US preferences in the Gulf outweighed
potential benefits of forging an independent policy.
Singaporean companies, for example, were advised by the country’s Foreign
Ministry to heed US unilateral sanctions against Iran, noting that several have
received heavy fines for multiple sanctions violations. While Singaporean officials were clear that they are not enforcing US sanctions, a spokesperson from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was explicit that companies in Singapore should
operate with the knowledge that “we expect companies with dealings with countries subject to unilateral U.S. sanctions will … make their own calculations and
decisions based on how this might impact on their own commercial interests.”32
This is consistent with the response in 2004 from a former Foreign Minister, who,
when asked about Singapore support for the US war in Iraq, responded: “we are
not pro-US; we are not anti-any country. What we are is that we are pro-Singapore
in the sense that ultimately what guides us in our foreign policy is our national
interest.”33
India provides another example. It has been in discussions with the Iranian
government to develop Chabahar port since 2003. For New Delhi this project
would provide a corridor to reach Afghanistan, Central Asia, and ultimately
Russia, representing important export markets and energy sources. The project
remained stalled until 2016 after the JCPOA was signed, when there was a brief
burst of energy as New Delhi and Tehran anticipated the long-awaited opportunity to develop the project. However, US withdrawal from the JCPOA two years
later put India’s Chabahar ambitions on hold once again.34 While India’s preference would clearly be to engage with Iran on Chabahar, it has proven unwilling to
challenge US leadership despite the costs.
China presents a more complicated case. It is not a US partner or ally but its
main strategic competitor, and China has also taken advantage of the US security
umbrella to deepen ties to the GCC. It has also consistently complied with US
sanctions on Iran, despite offering rhetorical support to the IRI.35 Despite following US preferences in the Gulf, bandwagoning, which implies support for
the hegemon’s ordering principles, is a less satisfying explanation of Chinese
regional behavior. China certainly has benefited from US preponderance in the
Gulf, but increasingly proves unwilling to support it unconditionally.36 Chinese
officials have been outspoken about American approaches to Iran since the US
withdrew from the JCPOA and adopted the ‘maximum pressure’ approach. In a
2019 meeting in Beijing with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif
shortly after the conclusion of joint naval exercises between China, Russia, and
Iran, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi said,
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the unilateral withdrawal by the US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action, giving up on its international commitments and [attempts] to exert
maximum pressure on Iran are the sources of the current tension arising over
the Iranian nuclear issue.37

Days later, after the assassination of General Qassim Soleimani, Wang complained
that the “dangerous US military operation violates the basic norms of international relations and will aggravate regional tensions and turbulence.”38 When the
US tried to extend the United Nations’ (UN) arms embargo on Iran months later,
the Chinese mission to the UN tweeted, “US failed to meet its obligations under
Resolution 2231 by withdrawing from #JCPOA. It has no right to extend an arms
embargo on Iran, let alone to trigger snapback. Maintaining JCPOA is the only
right way moving forward.”39 In material terms this may not translate into a revisionist approach to the Gulf from China, but it does indicate that the US cannot
take Chinese compliance for granted. As the great power competition narrative
comes to dominate thinking about the US–China bilateral relationship, a more
assertive China is likely to diverge from US preferences in MENA if Chinese
leaders believe that their regional interests are no longer secured under the US
umbrella.
Another factor that could result in different approaches to the Gulf from Asian
countries is the widespread perception that the US is in the process of attempting
to reduce its regional role.40 As described above, its diplomatic and military commitments to Gulf partners and allies remain robust, yet at the same time, political
pressure from a public favoring a less active presence in MENA has steadily been
building. This is not simply a matter of a public response to unpopular policies;
US interests in the region have long been transitioning. Former US Ambassador
to Israel Martin Indyk argued this point in a 2019 Wall Street Journal article,
claiming “few vital interests of the U.S. continue to be at stake in the Middle
East.”41 The belief that MENA issues have a direct impact on the US is declining:
There are no more imperiling threats from the Middle East that endanger
America’s social life, economic affluence, and political institutions; and so
controlling this region as uncontested hegemon is no longer vital to the US
position as a global superpower.42
Its core MENA interests have long been ensuring MENA energy supplies safely
reach global markets, freedom of navigation in and across an important geopolitical region, and contributing to Israeli security. Meeting these interests no longer
requires a US hegemonic presence. In terms of energy, America’s emergence as
the world’s largest energy producer recalibrates global energy markets. In fact,
the dramatic price drop during the 2020 Saudi-Russia ‘oil war’ demonstrates that
in energy markets, US and Gulf producers are competitors as well as necessary
partners to stabilize oil markets. As far as freedom of navigation, the capacity of
other extra-regional powers to play a larger role in maintaining open shipping
lanes is increasing, albeit slowly; President Trump’s previously mentioned tweets
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underscore why they likely see it as a necessity. The US-led Operation Sentinel is
a multilateral consortium of nine countries (Albania, Australia, Bahrain, Britain,
Lithuania, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the US) to “promote maritime
stability, ensure safe passage, and de-escalate tensions in international waters”
surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.43 A complementary mission is the Europeanled maritime surveillance mission in the Strait of Hormuz, including Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal. Both
Japan and South Korea have deployed independent maritime missions as well.44
These initiatives offer visions of what a less US-centered security architecture
could look like. Israeli security has also been rendered less immediate after it
established diplomatic relations with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan in
2020. While it still faces serious threats from Iran and its proxies, the range of
state-driven threats from within MENA is as low as it has ever been.45 Taken
together, the changing nature of US interests in MENA requires a foreign policy
recalibration as well, a point Karlin and Witts emphasized in arguing that although
the “Middle East still matters to the United States, it matters markedly less than
it used to,” explaining why recent presidential administrations shared “the view
that the United States is too involved in the region.”46 All of this contributes to a
widely-shared belief that the US is looking for a MENA exit strategy.

A Gulf order in flux: order transition, not Power Transition
What would US hegemonic retreat mean for Gulf order? The 2003 invasion of
Iraq is a major inflection point, and the consequences of the US’ inability to
achieve its goal of building a stable democratic Iraqi state has brought the idea
of US hegemony in the Gulf into question. Gause has described this unsuccessful attempt at re-ordering the Gulf subregion as ‘failed hegemony.’47 Philips has
referred to ‘perceived hegemony’:
the US has still been perceived by many Middle Eastern actors to be hegemonic, while Washington has understandably not sought to promote the reality
that it is less dominant than before. This misperception has impacted some
states’ policies, with allies such as Saudi Arabia repeatedly urging the US to
be more active, and growing disillusioned with Washington when it refused.48
Regional leaders must consider the US in their strategic calculus, but Washington’s
ability to achieve its preferred outcomes in the Gulf, either through force or persuasion, are limited, making the classification of the US as a Gulf hegemon inaccurate. Schmidt’s definition of hegemony rests on two pillars: preponderant power
and the exercise of leadership.49 Ikenberry and Nexon also emphasize the importance of the mobilization of leadership “by a preponderant power to order relations among actors”50 as a feature of hegemony. Goh’s study of East Asia in the
post-Cold War era makes the same point, that US regional hegemony was established and maintained “not merely as a result of its preponderance of power, but
mainly because of the complicity of key regional states, which prefer to sustain a
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regional order underpinned by US primacy and leadership.”51 As described above,
US power remains preponderant by conventional measures. Yet in constantly
signaling its intention for a reduced role, US leadership is questioned.
Cooley and Nexon’s work on hegemony emphasizes an important point for
Gulf order, explaining that in hegemonic systems “the dominant power enjoys a
near monopoly on the provision of international goods” or what they describe as
‘patronage monopoly,’52 which includes security commitments. The Gulf monarchies have long relied upon this to balance against their larger aggressive neighbors, but the alignment with the US has never been a comfortable fit. For one
thing, it has always been a set of interest-based rather than values-based relationships, anchored by political and military elites rather than popular support
or shared values. Another issue is the asymmetrical nature of the relationships,
which triggers a constant fear of abandonment within the GCC states. Al Shayji
has described US-GCC relations as “a classic case study of the built-in dilemmas
of an alliance between a stronger party and a weaker party.”53 Add to these factors
the prevailing narrative of US retreat from MENA, and the gap between the reality of deep military commitments and the belief of an imminent American retreat
becomes clearer. This in turn explains MENA policies from GCC states that often
diverge from the US and the increasing outreach to other extra-regional powers
for a wider array of interests beyond trade and investment. This also features in
Cooley and Nexon’s analysis of the decline of US hegemony: “But even if the
hegemon and its allies remain committed to supplying public, private and club
goods, the greater availability of alterative suppliers – of exit options – affects the
calculations of other states.”54 US allies and partners in the Gulf have been in the
process of developing these exit options, although their preference is clearly to
maintain a close security relationship with the US.
Consequently, the Gulf is a subregion in flux. The rise of China has resulted
in a growing body of work on power transition theory to explain the emerging
global order.55 Focusing on systemic instability that arises when a rising power’s
interests challenge those of a declining hegemon, this fits with the widespread
perception of a US in relative decline and a rising China, with the ‘Thucydides
Trap’ becoming a shorthand for great power competition.56 In the Gulf, as in many
other regions around the world however, this is not an accurate depiction of the
distribution of power. China’s military power in the Gulf is not simply lagging
behind the US; it is practically non-existent at this point. While this may not be
the case for long, it is unrealistic to imagine any scenario in which Chinese forces
could challenge those of the US in the Gulf region. A traditional power transition
is not happening in the Gulf, at least not yet. However, it is not unreasonable to
describe it as a subregion in the early stages of an order transition. Goh describes
the conditions of the end of a hegemonic order as taking place when “hegemonic
challengers necessarily dispute not only the incumbent’s hierarchical position,
but, more importantly, seek to revise the existing structure of differential benefits.”57 This provides a useful framework for considering Russia’s emergence as
a no-strings attached weapons supplier for MENA states, or China’s as a provider
of hard and soft infrastructure throughout the region; the ‘patronage monopoly’
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that Cooley and Nexon describe has been challenged. Ambitious extra-regional
actors have interpreted US hegemonic retreat as an opportunity to make inroads in
a region that has considerable strategic value.58 Regional actors, intensely aware
of the value of great power partnerships, are receptive to these overtures. The
US remains the most powerful conventional actor in the Gulf regional security
complex, but no longer enjoys what Wight called the ‘justification of power’: the
legitimacy to set the rules of a hegemonic order.59 This order in transition will
require states with regional interests to reconsider how they engage with the Gulf.

Asian Responses
What impact would a Gulf order transition have on the interests of Asian states
with deep regional interests? The Asian countries featured in this set of chapters have largely benefited from US hegemony in the Gulf, taking advantage
of American security commitments to develop substantial economic presences
without assuming a corresponding set of their own security commitments. A US
hegemonic retreat would likely require a recalibration of their thinking about how
to best approach Gulf security issues. They could use existing alignments in an
attempt to maintain the status quo. Conversely, they could determine that their
interests dictate a lighter engagement without the safety of the US umbrella. Each
has important commercial interests in the Gulf and relies heavily upon its energy.
Economic interdependence would indicate a motivation for being involved in
regional security. At the same time, each state under consideration has a different
strategic logic, informed by domestic, regional, or systemic pressures that will
determine whether it is worth shifting more military and diplomatic resources into
an unstable subregion.
Asian states are certainly important markets and partners for their counterparts in the Gulf. As seen in Table 2.1, Asia’s great powers – China, India, and
Japan – are all major import and export partners throughout the Gulf, while middle powers Singapore and South Korea have dense trade ties with some but not
all. This is not symmetrical by any means. For example, while China was Saudi
Arabia’s top import and export partner in 2020, Saudi Arabia ranked as China’s
24th largest export market and 13th largest source of imports.60 The nature of the
trade, with energy central to continued Asian economic growth, gives Gulf suppliers an outsized importance, however. Beyond trade, contracting, construction,
and services make the GCC states especially attractive partners for each of the
Asian states in question, making for economic relationships that appear remarkably sustainable for the long-term.
Yet despite these economic interests, security relations remain relatively
underdeveloped. To be sure, there are nascent moves in this direction, with several initiatives developing in recent years. India has intensified strategic relations
with GCC countries to the detriment of Iran. In 2014 it signed a defense cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, and a comprehensive strategic partnership with
the UAE in 2017.61 During a state visit to Oman in 2018 Prime Minister Modi
announced the signing of an agreement that provides the Indian navy with access

2
1
1
3
1
2
1

4

1
1
1
1
3
2
1

2

3

5
3
3
6
2
5
5
2

6
12
2
5
5
3
2

Exports

Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, 2020.

Bahrain
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
Saudi
Arabia
UAE

Imports

Imports

Exports

India

China

5

4
30
17
5
20
9
6

Imports

Japan

3

37
35
21
44
7
1
3

Exports

25

9
34
26
40
23
17
25

Imports

Singapore

Table 2.1 Ranking of Asian Countries as Import/Export Partners for Persian Gulf Countries, 2020

5

10
61
4
24
9
5
7

Exports

14

10
20
5
14
9
16
9

Imports

South Korea

10

15
59
5
29
3
4
4

Exports

18
Jonathan Fulton

Asian Powers and a Transitioning Gulf Order

19

to Oman’s port facilities in Duqm.62 There are several economic reasons for India
to deepen ties to the GCC states. Energy security is a factor; India is set to become
one of the world’s largest hydrocarbon importers; its oil demand is forecast to
increase to ten million barrels per day by 2040, up from 4.7 million in 2017.63 Gulf
energy features significantly in its consumption, with oil and gas from the GCC
consistently supplying India with over 50% of its imports. There is a substantial
Indian expatriate population on the Arabian Peninsula, estimated at nine million.64
Remittances from non-resident Indians in the Gulf are a major source of income,
accounting for 2% of its gross domestic product in 2019.65 Trade is also an issue;
as seen in Table 2.1, India does a significant volume of trade with the GCC.
There is a strategic logic as well. India’s largest security concern remains
Pakistan, which has long used Sunni Islam solidarity and security cooperation as a
means of strengthening its own relations with the Gulf countries. India’s difficult
history with Islam has contributed to uneasy state-to-state relations with the GCC
countries since partition. However, both sides have come to see value in cooperation to address their own regional security challenges. By engaging more deeply
with India, the GCC states have made Iran a less attractive partner for New Delhi.
Over the past twenty years India’s ties with Iran have cooled while those with the
GCC have grown considerably. This works in the other direction as well; India’s
much larger market and investment opportunities have attracted the GCC while
minimizing their reliance on Pakistan. Indian orientation in the Gulf is therefore
aligned with the GCC and is likely to maintain this trajectory, with or without US
commitments.66
Both Japan and South Korea have domestic constraints that limit significant
security cooperation, but have made inroads nonetheless. In Japan’s case, Article
9 of its constitution renounces war and pledges that “land, sea, and air forces,
as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” The Japanese military is therefore defensive by design with limited power projection capabilities.
However, it is making minor moves in this direction. In 2017, for example, it
appointed its first defense attaché to the UAE in a move described as part of an
effort to advance security cooperation.67 As discussed in Heng’s chapter,68 Japan’s
Maritime Self-Defense Force sent a destroyer to the Gulf in early 2020 after a
visit to Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the UAE from former Prime Minister Abe, who
described the mission as necessary because “Thousands of Japanese ships ply
those waters every year including vessels carrying nine tenths of our oil. It is
Japan’s lifeline.”69 (See Table 2.2.) Still, despite this rhetoric Japan’s engagement
does not represent a substantial contribution to maritime security.
As for South Korea, the domestic variable is the ongoing hostilities between
it and North Korea; it is both militarily and politically challenging to commit
troops to a far-off region with immediate security threats at the border, a point
Jeong’s chapter in this volume illustrates.70 However, deeper economic engagement, especially with the UAE, has resulted in security cooperation. In 2009,
South Korea’s Korea Electric Power Corporation signed a $20.4 billion contract
with the UAE’s Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation to design, build, and operate four ARR1400 nuclear power units at the Barakah nuclear power plant, which
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Table 2.2 Persian Gulf Crude Oil as
Percentage of Asian Imports, 2019
China
India
Japan
Singapore
South Korea

43%
57%
84%
66%
63%

Source: US Energy Information Administration,
Country Analysis, 2020; compiled by author.

opened in 2020.71 In 2018 it was revealed that a clause was added to the deal that,
according to former Defense Minister Kim Tae-Young, “guarantees the Korean
military’s automatic intervention in an emergency in the UAE.”72 Minister Kim
described it as a “low-risk” commitment because “the UAE is a country in which
a war had not taken place for a long time.”73 Nevertheless, this detail was not
made public until 2018, underscoring the political sensitivity involved in overseas security commitments. Another element of the South Korea–UAE security
relationship is the deployment of the Akh Unit, South Korean special forces, that
conducts joint training exercises and counterterrorism training in the UAE and has
been deployed since 2011.74
As Sim discusses in her chapter,75 Singapore has also made contributions to
Gulf security, but it too faces limitations. Singapore’s primary security concerns
remain rooted in Southeast Asia, and as a result its leaders cannot overcommit to
Gulf partners. Still, it contributed, alongside Gulf states, to the US-led Combined
Task Force 151 anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden between 2009 and
2014.76 Singapore deployed nearly 1000 Singapore Armed Forces personnel to
Iraq under the UN stability restoration operation between 2003 and 2008.77 It
also has contributed to the coalition against the Islamic State, providing another
opportunity to work with Gulf counterparts and reinforce Singapore’s reputation
as a responsible regional actor.
China too has made moves toward a larger security role, albeit in a somewhat
more balanced manner consistent with the ‘zero-enemy’ strategy described in
Sun’s chapter in this book.78 For example, it followed joint drills with the Saudi
navy in November 2019 with trilateral exercises with Iran and Russia one month
later.79 Chinese and Saudi Arabian special forces first conducted joint training
exercises in 2016 shortly after announcing their comprehensive strategic partnership.80 Arms sales have long featured in the bilateral relationship as well, although
on a modest scale when compared with the US. Chinese sales have largely filled
a gap when the Gulf monarchies have not been able to purchase from the US,
their vendor of choice. A case in point is a Chinese ballistic missile sale to Saudi
Arabia in the 1980s that eventually paved the road for Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations. The Saudis approached China because the US, under pressure from Israel,
refused an arms sale to Riyadh.81 An upgrade to the initial set of missiles was sold

Asian Powers and a Transitioning Gulf Order

21

to the Saudis in 2014.82 Qatar has also purchased ballistic missiles from China.83
Another component of the comprehensive strategic partnership between China
and Saudi Arabia was a deal between the King Abdulaziz City for Science and
Technology and China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation to build a
factory in Saudi Arabia to assemble and service Chinese Ch-4 drones for sales to
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UAE, Egypt, and Iraq.84 This is only the second Chinese
UAV factory to be built outside of the PRC. This too is the result of an inability
to purchase the preferred US option, in this case Predator UAVs, due to tight US
export restrictions on armed drones. Beyond joint training exercises and these
relatively modest arms sales, China’s security footprint in the Gulf remains quite
shallow.
Despite the beginnings of a larger security presence, the logic for each of these
countries appears to be consistent with hegemonic stability theory. A liberal argument emphasizes the economic benefits of maintaining the regional status quo and
continuing to bandwagon with US preferences in support of its Gulf allies and
partners. Challenging the US through soft or hard balancing would result in costly
competition that would only harm their own economies and present challenges
in other more vital regions.85 Since the Gulf is not a core interest for any of these
countries – in each case their primary security concerns lie elsewhere: in South
Asia for India; in East Asia for Japan, South Korea, and China; and Southeast
Asia for Singapore – supporting a fragile status quo in the Gulf continues to make
sense. A realist argument would posit that a state will accept the status quo so
long as the benefits are greater than the costs; once that situation changes, the
willingness to accept the dominant state’s preferences would pass.86 Of the Asian
states discussed here, only China could be expected to adopt this logic, given its
competitive relationship with the US. In the near term, however, the cost-benefit
calculation does not favor challenging the status quo. China has actively been
working to avoid disrupting a fragile Gulf order that continues to provide benefits.
This has important implications. Since India, Japan, Singapore, and South
Korea are all US allies or partners, their participation in Gulf security is not perceived as disruptive by the US. China is another matter. Asked in 2019 if China
would consider participating in Operation Sentinel, Ni Jian, its ambassador to the
UAE, commented that “We are studying the U.S. proposal on Gulf escort arrangements,”87 but Beijing ultimately declined. It is not surprising that China would
reject working with a US-centered maritime force given the competitive nature of
their relationship in other regions. Beijing has serious concerns about America’s
ability and motivation to constrain China’s rise to superpower status, and several
recent US government documents justify this concern. The 2017 US National
Security Strategy described “a geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order” that is “taking place in the Indo-Pacific region.” It
directly targeted China, claiming “Chinese dominance risks diminishing the sovereignty of many states in the Indo-Pacific.”88 The US Strategic Framework for
the Indo-Pacific, declassified in January 2021, makes this even more clear; its
first national security challenge is “How to maintain U.S. strategic primacy in
the Indo-Pacific region and promote a liberal economic order while preventing
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China from establishing new, illiberal spheres of influence, and cultivating areas
of cooperation to promote regional peace and prosperity?”89 This has not changed
with the President Joe Biden administration, which released its Interim National
Security Strategic Guidance document that describes China as “the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international
system.”90 For Chinese leaders, therefore, a foreign policy across the IOR cannot
be premised on US willingness to accommodate an increase in Chinese power
and influence.
In this case, a theory between bandwagoning and balancing is required to
explain China’s approach to the Gulf, and strategic hedging offers the most accurate account. Strategic hedging is an approach common to second-tier powers
that want to increase their political, economic, and military capabilities without
antagonizing the dominant power.91 Goh defines it as a “set of strategies aimed
at avoiding (or planning for contingencies in) a situation in which states cannot
decide upon more straightforward alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality.”92 By not overtly challenging the dominant power, the hedger
expands its regional capabilities, usually by economic means, and then slowly
by developing the military capacity to protect its gains.93 Looked at in this light,
China’s balanced approach, developing strong economic and political ties with
every state in the Gulf, is a textbook example of hedging.94
The implications of this for Gulf countries and those Asian states with dense
regional interests are important. If the US is looking for a reduced Gulf role yet
at the same time challenging China in other theaters of the Indo-Pacific, a more
assertive Chinese presence in the Gulf is a likely result. Beijing, believing that it
cannot rely upon US preponderance to secure Chinese citizens, assets, and commercial relations in the region, will need to rely on its own steam. As described
above, China’s power projection in MENA remains limited; the People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) support base in Djibouti remains, as of mid-2021,
its only overseas military installation. However, the announcement in 2018 of
the ‘Industrial Park – Port Interconnectivity, Two Wings and Two Wheels’ initiative hints at more to come.95 This initiative links Chinese commercial investments in industrial parks and ports spanning from the UAE to the Suez Canal,
ultimately linking supply chains and business clusters from the Persian Gulf to
the Mediterranean Sea. While the Djibouti base is the only military facility in
this initiative, China appears to be laying a foundation to a regional foothold that
could, if the need arose, eventually provide the PLAN with port facilities in the
northwest IOR.
For the time being this is unlikely. The GCC countries have been diversifying
their extra-regional relationships in a manner that is also consistent with hedging,96 but giving China naval access in the form of bases would be a breaking
point in their relationship with the US. While America’s long-term presence in
the Gulf is perceived as uncertain, there is no expectation that China or any other
country is willing or able to make the same kind of security commitments that
the US has provided over the past 30 years. The GCC countries and China will
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continue to engage with each other, but both sides are aware that the repercussions
of crossing an American red line are not yet worth the cost.
For Asian extra-regional powers, the US–China competition is no less challenging and threatens their interests in the Gulf and beyond. Asian security is
under-institutionalized and reliant upon the US hub-and-spoke alliance system.97
Beneath the tremendous development and prosperity lies what Lee calls ‘the
Asian paradox’: it is “a region that has been an unparalleled economic success
but that is also home to the world’s most dangerous, diverse, and divisive security, military, and political challenges.”98 The prospect of a US–China relationship
that transitions from competitive to confrontational could have dangerous consequences in flashpoints like the Korean Peninsula, the South China Sea, or the
Taiwan Strait. Singapore’s prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong, voiced this concern:
“if Washington tries to contain China’s rise or Beijing seeks to build an exclusive
sphere of influence in Asia – they will begin a course of confrontation that will
last decades and put the long-heralded Asian century in jeopardy.”99 Gulf countries, newly Asianized, are equally vulnerable.

Conclusion
States around the world are deeply integrated politically, militarily, and economically with both the US and China. The prospect of becoming caught between the
two superpowers is unappealing, and significant diplomatic energy will likely be
expended in an attempt to strike a balanced approach. Alignment patterns across
the IOR might make this difficult to achieve, however, as the US approach to the
Indo-Pacific, centered on security cooperation with the Quad, is seen by Beijing
as a China containment strategy.100 A similar dynamic is at play in the Gulf, as
the US has pressured its regional allies and partners to eliminate engagement with
China in areas with security risks, especially technological cooperation in 5G
networks, artificial intelligence, satellite communications, and cybersecurity.101
It is increasingly clear that despite local preferences, the Gulf is under threat of
becoming a theater of great power competition between the US and China.
Asian countries, with their reliance on Gulf energy and strong economic incentives to maintain strong Gulf relations, will need to skillfully navigate this transitioning regional order.
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